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Non-technical summary
During recent years the question of legal standing of consumer associations in the course of private
cartel damage claims has increasingly attracted attention within the European Commission (EC).
The European Consumer Consultative Group (ECCG), a sub division of the EC for end consumer
interests, adopted an opinion on private damages actions in November 2010. The ECCG states
that “innovative and practical solutions to the calculation of damages are needed to replace the
often impossible task of calculating the exact loss.”
Against this background, we show in this article how final consumer damages can be empirically
quantified. In particular, using a consumer panel dataset with 35.000 transactions we estimate the
damage suffered by German consumers due to the European detergent cartel. The cartel lasted
from January 2002 until March 2005 and covered the markets of eight European countries. The
three largest producers of heavy laundry detergents, who collect around two thirds of the sales and
volume in the German detergent market, were involved in this cartel.
Our estimations suggest average overcharges between 6.7 and 6.9 percent and an overall consumer
damage of about 13.2 million Euro over the period from July 2004 until March 2005. Under the
assumptions that the cartel-induced share on turnover is representative for the entire cartel period
and all affected markets, the overall consumer damage even accounts for about 315 million Euro.
Our results further suggest that the retailers reacted to the price increases of the cartel firms
via price increases for their own detergent products, resulting in significant umbrella effects. We
quantify the damage due to this umbrella pricing to a total of 7.34 million Euro. Our findings are
important for cartel damage estimations in general and for the quantification of consumer harm
by consumer associations in particular.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze
In den vergangenen Jahren wurde der Frage nach der Klagebefugnis von Verbraucherverbänden
im Rahmen privater Schadensersatzforderungen bei Kartellfällen zunehmend Aufmerksamkeit von
Seiten der Europäischen Kommission (EK) eingeräumt. Die Europäische Beratende Verbraucher-
gruppe (ECCG), ein von der EK eingerichtetes Konsortium europäischer und nationaler Verbrau-
cherorganisationen, veröffentlichte im November 2010 eine Stellungnahme zu privaten Schadenser-
satzerklagen. Darin weist die ECCG darauf hin, dass “innovative und praktische Lösungen zur
Berechnung von Schäden benötigt werden, um die oftmals unmögliche Aufgabe der Berechnung
des exakten Schadens zu lösen”.
Vor diesem Hintergrund zeigen wir in dem vorliegendem Papier, wie der von Endkonsumenten erlit-
tene Kartellschaden empirisch ermittelt werden kann. Unter Verwendung eines Konsumentenpanel-
Datensatzes bestehend aus 35.000 Transaktionen schätzen wir den von deutschen Konsumenten
erlittenen monetären Schaden infolge des Europäischen Waschmittelkartells. Das Kartell existierte
zwischen Januar 2002 und März 2005 und war in insgesamt acht europäischen Ländern aktiv. Die
drei größten Waschmittelhersteller, welche zusammen etwa zwei Drittel des Umsatzes und Absat-
zes im deutschen Waschmittelmarkt vereinnahmten, waren an dem Kartell beteiligt.
Unsere Schätzungen ergeben durchschnittliche kartellbedingte Preisaufschläge zwischen 6.7 und 6.9
Prozent und einen Konsumentenschaden von insgesamt 13.2 Millionen Euro für den Zeitraum Juli
2004 bis März 2005. Unter der Annahme, dass der kartellbedingte Anteil am Umsatz repräsentativ
für den gesamten Kartellzeitraum und alle betroffenen Märkte ist, ergibt sich ein Gesamtscha-
den von 315 Millionen Euro. Unsere Ergebnisse deuten zudem darauf hin, dass die Einzelhändler
auf die Preiserhöhungen der Kartellfirmen mittels Preiserhöhungen für ihre selbst produzierten
Waschmittelprodukte reagiert haben und es dadurch zu signifikanten Preisschirmeffekten kam. Die
dadurch verursachten Konsumentenschäden belaufen sich auf insgesamt 7.34 Millionen Euro. Un-
sere Ergebnisse liefern wichtige Erkenntnisse für Schadensschätzungen im Allgemeinen und für die
Quantifizierung von Konsumentenschäden durch Verbraucherverbände im Speziellen.
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Abstract
We use consumer panel data to calculate the damage suffered by German consumers due to a
detergent cartel that was active between 2002 and 2005 in eight European countries. Applying
before-and-after and difference-in-differences estimations we find average overcharges between
6.7 and 6.9 percent and an overall consumer damage of about 13.2 million Euro over the
period from July 2004 until March 2005. Under the assumptions that the cartel-induced share
on turnover is representative for the entire cartel period and all affected markets, the overall
consumer damage would even sum up to about 315 million Euro. Our results further suggest
that the retailers reacted to the price increases of the cartel firms via price increases for their
own detergent products, resulting in significant umbrella effects. We quantify the damage due
to this umbrella pricing to a total of about 7.34 million Euro. With respect to the discussion
whether special procedures for bringing collective actions should be available in the EU, our
results are important to the extent that we show how consumer associations can use consumer
panel data in order to claim damages before national courts and thereby actively fulfill their
mandate of consumer protection.
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1 Introduction
While cartel damages of purchasers are already widely discussed in both academia and practice,
consumer harm has only played a minor role in the context of cartel damages claims so far.1 This is
for obvious reasons. The damage suffered by an individual consumer regularly falls below the legal
expenses needed to receive a compensation. Furthermore, in contrast to firms final consumers are
not obliged to keep receipts and are therefore often neither able to prove the fact that they bought
the cartel product during the collusive period nor at which price. This is especially the case when
considering groceries, where several cartels have recently been discovered.2 Last but not least,
current European competition law does not favor the exercise of class-action lawsuits which would
allow to effectively bundle the individual claims of final consumers and could (at least) partially
overcome some obstacles.
Despite these hurdles, during recent years the question of legal standing of consumer asso-
ciations in the course of private damage claims has increasingly attracted attention within the
European Commission (EC).3 The “European Consumer Consultative Group” (ECCG), a sub di-
vision of the EC for end consumer interests, adopted an opinion on private damages actions in
November 2010. It contains several proposals to improve private damages actions by consumer
associations, amongst others (i) the facilitation of the burden of proof for consumer organizations
and (ii) the assurance of redress for all consumers. In this context, the ECCG states that “innova-
tive and practical solutions to the calculation of damages are needed to replace the often impossible
task of calculating the exact loss.”4 In particular, the ECCG argues that “it should be possible to
rely on a reasonable estimate of an overcharge.”5
Against this background, we contribute to the current discussion by showing how final consumer
damages can be quantified empirically. In particular, we estimate the damage suffered by German
consumers due to the European detergent cartel. The cartel lasted from January 2002 until March
2005 and covered the markets of eight European countries. The three largest producers of heavy
laundry detergents, who collect around two thirds of the sales and volume in Germany, were
involved in this cartel.6 For the estimation, we use survey data of consumer transactions from The
Nielsen Company. The dataset covers the last nine months of the cartel period and additionally 15
1One example is the French mobile phone cartel, in which the French consumer association “UFC Que Choisir”
attracted around 12.500 consumers for an (in the end unsuccessful) opt-in damage claim. In the UK, the consumer
association “Which!” also claimed damages against JJB Sports, however, only 130 consumers joined the claim. See
Bien, 2013.
2Remarkable examples are the three German cases coffee roasters (2010), chocolate manufacturers (2012) and
most recently flour (2013).
3The starting point was the EC green paper (EC, 2005) on damage claims, in which one section explicitly deals
with the defense of consumer interests and raises the question whether special procedures for bringing collective
actions and protecting consumer interests should be available. This view was emphasized in the subsequent white
paper (EC, 2008), in which the EC states “that there is a clear need for mechanisms allowing aggregation of the
individual claims of victims of antitrust infringements”.
4See European consumer consultative group (2010) – Opinion on private damages actions, section 2.3.
5Id.
6See, e.g., Commission decision of 13.04.2011, Case Comp/39579 - Consumer detergents.
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months after the breakdown of the cartel, which we use as competitive counterfactual benchmark.
We find an overall consumer damage of about 13.2 million Euro over the period from July
2004 until March 2005. Under the assumptions that the cartel-induced share on turnover is repre-
sentative for the entire cartel period and all affected markets, the overall consumer damage even
accounts for about 315 million Euro. This might still be a conservative estimate, as especially in
the beginning of the cartel, prices could have been substantially higher and after cartel breakdown
prices in general do not immediately adjust to the competitive level again.
The article is organized as follows. The subsequent section reviews the theoretical background
of cartel damages and describes the potential harm that could emerge on the final consumer
stage. Section 3 summarizes the cartel case under scrutiny and gives a description of the data
set. Section 4 then describes our estimation approach and the calculation of the overall damage of
German consumers. The article concludes with a summary of the main results and a discussion of
policy implications in Section 5.
2 Related literature
The quantification of cartel damages is usually not straightforward. Especially when considering
multi-layer markets in which one product is used as input in the production process of the adjacent
stage, it is demanding to examine and allocate the various effects that percolate through the up-
and downstream layers after cartel formation. In general, the emergence of a cartel at some stage of
such a supply chain leads to a higher price and less output in comparison to the prior competitive
situation. That is, purchasers are confronted with higher input costs and may react to this change
via own price increases, leading to further passing-on effects in the downstream layers. These price
increases are generally accompanied by demand restrictions (“output effects”) that detract firm
specific profits.7 If one were to estimate the overall harm of cartelization all these effects must be
taken into account.8
Within such a multi-layer market final consumers take a special position as they can not pass
on the price increase they suffer. Thus, they can either accept the loss in consumer welfare or
change their buying behavior and buy cheaper substitutes. However, those substitutes may itself
be overpriced due to possible umbrella effects, implying that consumers are particularly in need of
protection towards antitrust infringements.
7See Van Dijk and Verboven (2008) for a more detailed description of the different effects.
8More precisely, one would further have to include the damages of cartel suppliers and potential purchasers as
well. Cartel suppliers might be damaged due to output restrictions, because less inputs are needed by the cartelists
to produce the lower output. This may similarly lead to passing-on effects and price changes in the upstream layers.
For an in-depth analysis, see Bueren and Smuda (2013). Potential purchasers might be damaged if they bought
substitutes from non-colluding firms but would have bought the cartel product if prices had been constant. Thus,
the overcharge suffered by them equals the difference between the price of the substitute and the but-for price of
the cartel product.
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Han et al. (2008) theoretically show that the loss in consumer surplus is composed of two
parts, the overcharge effect that equals the price increase of the product from the adjacent layer
above multiplied by the quantity purchased, and the output effect which reflects foregone consumer
purchases due to the higher price. They further analyze the impact of the level of competition at
one layer on the magnitude of the passing-on effect as well as the size of the consumer damage
relative to the direct purchaser overcharge. If perfect competition exists on each downstream
layer, the incidental price increase of cartelists is completely passed on to final customers. The
overall damage suffered by them can then even be larger than the direct purchaser overcharge.
Conversely, if there is substantial market power in the intermediate layers the direct purchaser
overcharge overestimates consumer harm.
Boone and Mueller (2012) use a market model with three layers to analyze the distribution of
overall harm in terms of lost profits and lost consumer welfare between cartel purchasers and final
consumers for the cases of homogenous and heterogeneous products. They find that the consumer
harm share (CHS) is negatively related to (i) the industry aggregate price-cost margin and (ii) the
pass-through elasticity, which measures the percentage change in output price in response to a one
percent increase in input costs. In addition, they show that the CHS is independent of the number
of downstream firms that are directly affected by cartelization.9
In sum, economic theory shows that in vertically related markets final consumers might face
substantial cartel damages even if several intermediate layers are interposed between cartel stage
and final consumers. The size of the damage however depends on the number of intermediate
layers and their corresponding levels of competition. The lower the number of intermediate layers
and the higher the degree of competition, the higher the price overcharge for final consumers.
In our case we have two intermediate layers placed between cartelists and consumers: whole-
salers and retailers. Since wholesalers and retailers are typically integrated, increases in costs due
to higher cartel prices are directly passed on to the retailers. Furthermore, the degree of competi-
tion in the retailing market is considered to be high.10 Retailers therefore set prices based on the
wholesale price increased by a margin, which is based on the costs of retailing. Thus, we believe
that a substantial fraction of the cartel induced cost increase should have been passed on to finals
consumers, suggesting remarkable damages.
9Additional literature is available on cartel damages and passing-on effects in vertically related markets such as
Kosicki and Cahill (2006), Verboven and van Dijk (2009) and Basso and Ross (2010), however, their articles do not
explicitly deal with final consumer damages but rather focus on direct (indirect) purchasers.
10The ongoing German sector inquiry did not reveal any competition problems until now.
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3 Description of the cartel case and the dataset
3.1 The European washing powder cartel
Procter & Gamble (Ariel and Lenor brands), Unilever (Coral brands) and Henkel (Persil brands)
are the leading producers of washing powder in Europe. According to the EC, these three firms
engaged in a cartel from at least January 2002 until March 2005, which was aimed at stabilizing
market positions and at coordinating prices in violation of EU and EEA antitrust rules (Article
101 of the EU treaty and Art. 53 of the EEA agreement).11 The agreement covered the markets
in Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands and concerned
heavy-duty laundry detergent powders used in washing machines (HDD low suds powder).12 The
cartel started when the companies implemented an initiative through their trade association to
improve the environmental performance of detergent products (AISE initiative).13
After cartel breakdown in 2005 and three further years of silence Henkel applied for leniency at
the EC in 2008 and revealed the anti-competitive practices.14 The EC carried out inspections in
June 2008 and subsequently, Procter & Gamble and Unilever also applied for leniency under the
EU’s Leniency Notice.15
On 13 April 2011, the EC fined Procter & Gamble and Unilever a total of 315.2 million Euro.
Henkel received full immunity in terms of a 100 percent fine reduction because it was the first
to inform the EC. Procter & Gamble and Unilever were granted leniency reductions of 50 and
25 percent, respectively. Moreover, they also benefited from a 10 percent reduction due to their
agreement for a settlement procedure that allowed the EC to simplify and reduce the length of
the investigation.16 Thus, the information about the workings of the cartel given in the decision
document is comparatively rather scarce. The Commission does not give any information why the
cartel ended.
According to the EC the three firms were involved in various anti-competitive practices that
have been coordinated in the course of meetings during the AISE environmental initiative. Firstly,
they agreed on indirect price increases, comprising that prices were not reduced when the product
11See EC press release IP/11/473, 13/04/2011.
12See Commission decision of 13.04.2011, Case Comp/39579 - Consumer detergents, paragraph 15.
13The AISE environmental initiative is a voluntary initiative across different countries of the EEA. It targets
amongst others on taking into account environmental considerations in the design of laundry detergent products
and packages. The AISE’s “Code of good Environmental Practices” specifies concrete goals in this regard, e.g. a 10
percent reduction per capita packaging material tonnage consumption.
14It is worth noting that in December 2011 the French competition authority has fined a similar cartel for price-
fixing of washing powders, tablets and liquids in the French market between 1997 and 2004. Importantly, in addition
to Colgate-Palmolive the participating firms were Henkel, Unilever and P&G. The chronology of events suggests that
the discovery of both cartels is closely related: In May 2008, Unilever applied for leniency at the French competition
authority and only eight weeks later a leniency application by Henkel received the French regulator. After two
further weeks Henkel then applied for leniency at the EC, Unilever however waited with its leniency application at
the EC until October 2009. Hence, whereas Henkel received full immunity in the pan-European case and was fined
by the French competition authority for its offense in the French market, Unilever got full immunity in the French
case but was fined by the EC for its participation in the EU case.
15Supra n. 6.
16Id.
4
volume or the number of wash loads per package was downsized, or when the products were
compacted in terms of reduced weight.17 Furthermore, benefits and cost savings from reduced
raw materials, packaging and transport costs were collectively refused to pass on to consumers.18
Secondly, the three cartelists agreed on a direct price increase at specific markets towards the end
of 2004. These anti-competitive markups were realized via price leadership, in which the market
leader pretended and implemented the excessive pricing pattern first and the other firms followed.19
Last but not least, Henkel, P&G and Unilever collectively restricted their promotional activity by
excluding specific types of promotions during the implementation of the different phases of the
environmental initiative.20
In the course of this article we concentrate on the former anti-competitive practice. That is,
we empirically analyze the indirect price increases that were realized during the cartel period. We
then provide an estimate of the monetary damage suffered by consumers.
3.2 Dataset
We use a consumer panel dataset for the detergent category provided by The Nielsen Company.
About 16.000 German customers report which products they bought on a daily basis. The dataset
is at the product code level and includes characteristics like washing purpose, package type and
size, detergent consistency, scent and concentration. For consumers, typical sociodemographic
variables and a scaling factor for representativeness are given.
At first sight one might think that laundry detergent is a homogenous product. However, in
total the dataset contains information on 1.145 different product codes. One has to distinguish
between light-duty, heavy-duty, wool, cold and drape detergent; additional product characteristics
are sensitive, color, unconcentrated and concentrated detergents. Regarding the consistency one
can further differentiate between powder, liquid, tabs, wash nuts and gel. According to the EC the
cartel only targeted at heavy-duty detergents in powder form. We therefore just use this distinct
subcategory and omit the rest of the observations, which leaves us with approximately 35.000
observations that are attributed to 494 different product codes and 27 brands.
With respect to the classification of brands, we can generally distinguish between three groups
of brands:
1. Cartel brands: Products of Henkel, Procter & Gamble and Unilever
2. Competitive private brands by the retailers: e.g. Tandil from Aldi
3. Competitive manufacturer brands
17Supra n. 6, paragraph 25.
18Id.
19Id.
20Id.
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As it is possible that both retailer and competitive manufacturer respond to price increases by the
cartel via price changes of their own detergent products, we apply the (before-and-after) overcharge
estimation separately to all three groups of brands. This additionally allows us the identification
of a possible reference (brand-) category, which we can use for difference-in-differences estimations.
Another aspect that should be discussed is the level of data aggregation in the course of damage
estimations. We use data on a highly disaggregated level in terms of single purchase acts of the
observed consumers. This has mainly two reasons. Firstly, the product is highly differentiated and
the various product characteristics of washing powder lead to price differences between product
categories. When using aggregated prices and analyzing their changes, one can not distinguish
between substitution effects and price changes on the product level. Secondly, in aggregated figures
information on the numerous discounts that consumers obtain due to promotional activities are
lost, which can bias the estimation. We therefore use single purchase acts as observation unit and
do not further aggregate our data on a weekly or monthly basis.
The observed time period is from July 2004 until June 2006. Following the decision of the EC,
we define March 2005 as the end of the cartel.21 Thus, the dataset covers the last nine months of
the cartel period and additionally 15 months of the post-cartel period.
3.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics of the data set.22 58 percent of the purchase acts
concern cartelfirm products and 39 percent of the observations refer to retailer brands. By contrast,
manufacturer brand products contribute 3 percent of the data.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. dev. Variable Mean Std. dev.
Price/kg 1.98 0.78 Concentrated 0.62 0.49
Cartel Brands 0.58 0.49 Color 0.34 0.47
Retailer Brands 0.39 0.49 Sensitive 0.03 0.18
Manufacturer Brands 0.03 0.17 Packaging: Box 0.33 0.47
Cartel Brands (CP) 0.19 0.39 Packaging: Bag 0.54 0.50
Retailer Brands (CP) 0.12 0.32 Packaging: Carry pack 0.13 0.33
Manufacturer Brands (CP) 0.01 0.10 Package size 2.97 2.30
Promotion 0.29 0.45 Package size(sq) 14.07 23.06
Gimmick 0.07 0.26
n = 35.225
21It is worth noting that after a cartel breakdown prices might not immediately return to the competitive level.
In particular, following Harrington (2004a, 2004b) cartels may try to stay on a higher price path after cartel
breakdown by implementing some forms of tacit collusion. This results in an overestimation of the but-for price and
a corresponding underestimation of the overcharge. Our overcharge estimates are therefore conservative and should
provide lower bounds of the real overcharge.
22Variables that refer to the period of collusion are marked with CP (cartelperiod). At this stage the given
statistics are not representative since panel participation varies over time. The descriptive statistics of all CP
variables must therefore be interpreted with caution. For the overcharge estimation, however, this is negligible as
long as purchase acts are randomly drawn.
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The shares of purchase acts during collusion are 19, 12 and 1 percent for cartel, retailer and
manufacturer brands, respectively. Hence, 32 percent of all purchase acts in the dataset occurred
during collusion, which is consistent with the 9 out of 24 months of the observation period.
29 percent of all detergents were sold in at least one form of promotion, that is, a price-flag,
feature, handbill or display. As for most observations those different activities occur simultaneously,
we combine them in the variable “Promotion” and control for it in our regressions. In 7 percent
of the transactions the detergents were sold with a give-away and we therefore further include the
binary variable “Gimmick”.
Regarding product characteristics, 62 percent of the purchase acts concern concentrated and 34
percent color detergent. Sensitive detergents by contrast merely represent 3 percent of the data.
In concentrated detergents the effective amount of detergent is higher, which in turn leads to a
higher price. With respect to the type of packaging, most detergents are bought in refill bags (54
percent), followed by boxes (33 percent) and carry packs (13 percent). We use boxes as reference
package type in our estimations.
The average per kilogram price of powdered laundry detergent is 1.98 Euro. The per kilogram
price varies considerably between 60 cents for the cheapest and 6.33 Euro for the most expensive
product. The average package size of detergents in our dataset is 2.97 kilogram. As Figure 1 reveals,
the average per kilogram price does not linearly decline in package size but over-proportionally. In
order to see whether this nonlinear pattern is still observable if we account for different product
characteristics, we include both the package size and its square as independent variables in our
model.
Figure 1: Price vs. package size; linear and quadratic fit
Table 2 summarizes price statistics for the cartel products as well as for manufacturer and retailer
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brands during and outside the cartel period.23 These numbers must be interpreted with care, as
the price statistics do not take product differentiation and changes in costs into account. In general,
cartel products are the most expensive ones, followed by retailer and manufacturer brands. For
cartel brands, both average and median per kilogram prices are slightly higher during the period of
collusion. By contrast, the mean prices of retailer and manufacturer products are lower during the
cartel period. However, whereas the price reduction of retailer brands is negligible, manufacturer
brands are considerably cheaper during collusion. This is at least partly due to the fact that input
costs distinctly decreased during the cartel period and increased afterwards, thereby reducing
production costs for all (cartel and non-cartel) detergent producers.
Table 2: Price statistics (in €/kg) during cartel and non-cartel period
Price Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max
Cartel Brands (NCP) 2.28 2.41 0.85 0.64 6.32
Cartel Brands (CP) 2.33 2.46 0.87 0.67 5.91
Manufacturer Brands (NCP) 1.45 1.03 0.76 0.61 3.70
Manufacturer Brands (CP) 1.34 0.85 0.83 0.60 3.79
Retailer Brands (NCP) 1.55 1.55 0.23 0.60 3.76
Retailer Brands (CP) 1.54 1.60 0.19 0.76 2.43
All 1.98 1.62 0.78 0.60 6.33
4 Overcharge estimation and consumer damage
4.1 Estimation methods
The most challenging issue in the quantification of cartel damages lies in the identification of a
suitable counterfactual situation describing how the market outcome would have evolved in a com-
petitive environment. Econometric damage estimation mainly follows either the so called “before
and after”, the “yardstick” or the “difference-in-differences” approach.24 The former method com-
pares for the same market pre- and/or post cartel prices to the prices paid by purchasers during
collusion. It is assumed that the competitive situation in the market during the cartel would have
been similar to the situation before and/or after collusion. Regressing the price of the concerned
product on a binary variable for the cartel period and a number of control variables allows to
determine the average cartel induced price increase during collusion and thus the identification of
a suitable benchmark price. The damage is then calculated as difference between the observed
cartel price and the corresponding but-for price, multiplied by the quantity of the product sold
in the cartel period.25 By contrast, the yardstick method uses data on the cartelized market and
specific yardstick markets that are comparable to the cartel market in terms of demand and cost
23Variables that refer to the non-collusive period are marked with NCP (non-cartel period).
24See Oxera, 2009.
25See Davis and Garcés, 2010.
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factors as well as product characteristics, but not affected by cartelization. That is, one uses for
instance the same product market in other countries as benchmark for the same time period.
The difference-in-differences approach combines the two formerly described methods. It com-
pares the price changes of the cartel products with benchmark products during and outside the
cartel period in order to identify anti-competitive price deviations. Following Oxera (2009), the
basic idea of this approach can be described as follows:
Figure 2: Difference-in-differences method
Non-cartel period Cartel period Overcharge estimation
Cartel firms A B (B −A)− (D − C)Non-cartel firms C D
Let A and B be the average prices charged by the cartel firms outside and during the cartel
period for the cartel product, and C and D the average prices charged by non-cartel firms for the
same product outside and during the cartel period. In our case for instance, we use price data of
powdered laundry detergent from the three cartel firms as well as from various other non-cartel
firms. The difference (B-A) then captures the price change of the cartelized product between cartel
and non-cartel period. As this difference may not be completely driven by the cartel but at least
partly due to other factors, the difference (D-C) is used as benchmark. It reflects the price change
of the same product produced by non-cartel firms between both periods of time. As both cartel
and non-cartel firms should be confronted with the same market and input cost variations over
time, the difference in the differences (B-A)-(D-C) should separate those factors and capture the
cartel caused price increase.26
In the following we will estimate a before-and-after model not only for cartel brands but sep-
arately for all three groups of brands. This allows us to identify whether retailer brands and/or
competitive manufacturer brands are suitable reference categories for a subsequent difference-in-
differences estimation. Precisely, since it can be expected that non-cartel firms react to the price
increases by the cartel firms via own price increases (umbrella pricing) or price reductions (in
order to encourage the redirection of demand from cartel brands to own products), both possible
reference categories can only be used if we do not observe - after having controlled for all relevant
price drivers - a significant price reaction for these products during the collusive period.
4.2 Before-and-after approach: implementation and results
We implement the before-and-after approach in a reduced-form or “hedonic” framework by esti-
mating the following fixed effects panel data model:
26This approach is based on the assumption that cartel and non-cartel firms react similarly to demand, supply
and market changes in terms of adaptions in their product prices.
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log(pit) = β0 + β
′
1Characteristicsi + β
′
2Costst + β
′
3Retailit + β4Cartelt + εit.
In all our estimations the dependent variable is the logarithm of the price for one kilogram heavy-
duty detergent of a specific product type i at time t.27 We use the price per quantity instead of
the full package price because we observe even for the same brand up to five different package sizes
during the observation period. Thus, using the price per quantity makes products more comparable
and eases interpretation. We also decided to use the logarithm instead of the absolute value of the
kilogram price as it allows to measure relative effects of the independent variables. When thinking
about retailer margins, the retailer would rather add an amount relative to the wholesale price
instead of a fix sum; the same applies for discounts.
We explain the price differences of detergents by their characteristics, cost development over
time, the conduct of the retailers and the effect of the upstream cartel.28
Cross-sectional product characteristics
In principle, one could measure the effect of the cartel for each product code we observe. However,
as most product codes are not available for the whole observation period29 and in order to make
products more comparable, we abstract from product codes in favor of underlying product char-
acteristics, which are likely to explain price differences across product codes. It should be noted
that the reduced form approach can not separate whether the characteristics’ effect on price stem
from the demand or the supply side as we only observe the net effect. Included characteristics are
indicator variables for color, sensitive and concentrated detergents, respectively. We additionally
include binary variables for the type of packaging as measures for packaging costs. Furthermore,
it is controlled for package size and its square, as it can be observed that smaller packages are
sold at an over-proportionally higher per kilogram price; this can coevally be explained by price
discrimination of second degree and economies of scale. We additionally include fixed effects for
the brands. They reflect the fact that brands might have a different popularity due to differing ad-
vertising intensities. In addition, the fixed effects allow for different margins of the manufacturers
as well as differences in production and marketing costs.
27Note that at this point we estimate separate models for cartel, retailer and competitive manufacturer brands.
Different product types therefore refer to the same main brand but differentiate with respect to package size, package
type as well as further product characteristics (e.g. color, sensitive and concentrated detergents).
28It is worth noting that we do not explicitly control for demand drivers in our regressions. As the consumption
of washing powder is relatively stable per household and over time, we do not expect the overall demand to
change fundamentally in the long term. In the short term however, consumers might be sensitive with respect
to price changes and special offers. Those substitution effects nevertheless primarily occur between products that
are similarly perceived by consumers, which should coincide with our brand categorization.
29There are several reasons for this. First, we only have price data of products the representative sample of
consumers bought. Beyond that, it frequently happens that producers exchange the varieties of their products.
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Time-varying factors
To control for non-cartel induced price differences over time, we use six cost measures which reflect
input and production costs for the detergent producers. These are monthly price indices for palm
oil, raps oil, rock phosphate, industrial power, chemical base materials and retail prices which we
obtained from the German Statistical Office and the platform Index Mundi.30 As the detergents
are not produced at the same day they are sold, we include the logarithm of all of these variables
lagged by one month.
Retailers conduct
Considering the retailers conduct, we account for different retailer margins and costs by including
indicator variables for each of the 15 biggest chains represented in our dataset. We take Lidl as
reference chain as consumers can find both manufacturer and retailer brands there. We do not
interact the chain fixed effects with the cartel period indicator variable as we do not expect retailer
margins and costs to change due to the upstream cartel.31 For retailer brands, we set all chain
indicator variables to zero. One reason for this is a technicality. As most retailers only sell one
retailer brand in the detergent category, we would have perfect collinearity with the brand fixed
effects. Furthermore, one can conceptually argue that there is only one margin which is already
accounted for by the brand fixed effect.
Some products were occasionally promoted via price tags, features and handbills or separately
displayed. We therefore include another dummy variable for those product specific advertising
efforts (“Promotion”). Last but not least, we include the binary variable “Gimmick” which is
equal to one if a product was sold with a give-away.
Cartel effect
To measure the overcharge caused by the cartel we include the binary variable Cartelt, which
is equal to one during the cartel period and zero otherwise. The estimated coefficient of this
variable captures the average percentage price change during the cartel period compared to the
competitive phase.
Table 3 summarizes the results of before-and-after fixed effects estimation32 for all three
30Index Mundi collects detailed country statistics, charts, and maps compiled from multiple sources, see
http://www.indexmundi.com .
31The inclusion of the interactions results in insignificant coefficients for all terms. Testing for joint significance
also results in favor of the null hypotheses of no joint significance.
32We also estimated the model without fixed effects, i.e. Pooled OLS. Omitting fixed effects biases the overcharge
estimate as there is a cartel-independent heterogeneity among brand prices. This even becomes more crucial in
the difference-in-differences setting. Standard errors also differ significantly in the Pooled OLS case, indicating
substantial heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of the error terms. Hence, robust and clustered standard errors
are mandatory for correct inference.
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groups of brands.33 The indicator variables for concentrated, color and sensitive detergent do not
significantly influence the logarithm of the per kilogram price of cartel products. By contrast, we
find significant higher prices of sensitive retailer brands (32.7%) and concentrated competitive
manufacturer brands (23.6%). With respect to the package size, we see the expected non-linear
pattern for all three groups of brands. Furthermore, whereas the type of packaging does not seem
to influence the relative prices of cartel and competitive manufacturer brands, retailer brands sold
in bags are significantly higher priced than in boxes (7.36%). In addition, on average promotional
activities decrease the per kilogram prices by 10.6% (cartel and comp. man. brands) and 1.40%
(retailer brands), respectively. Cartel products sold with gimmicks do not show a significantly
different price than products without gimmicks, however, competitive manufacturer detergents
sold with gimmicks are significantly lower priced.34
Table 3: Before-and-after estimation results
Variable Cartel brands Retailer brands Comp. man. brands
Concentrated 0.073 (0.065) 0.006 (0.013) 0.212*** (0.026)
Color 0.008 (0.008) -0.015 (0.016) -0.003 (0.010)
Sensitive -0.001 (0.008) 0.283*** (0.024) -0.004 (0.032)
Package size -0.178*** (0.016) -0.175*** (0.048) -0.260*** (0.009)
Package size(sq) 0.009*** (0.001) 0.010* (0.005) 0.014*** (0.001)
Packaging: Bag 0.033 (0.029) 0.071*** (0.012)
Packaging: Carry Pack -0.031 (0.017) -0.001 (0.055) 0.068 (0.013)
Gimmick -0.026 (0.020) -0.056*** (0.018)
Promotion -0.112*** (0.008) -0.014* (0.007) -0.112*** (0.010)
Chem. base mat. (L1) 0.150 (0.259) -0.664*** (0.086) -1.616*** (0.309)
Retail prices (L1) 1.244** (0.515) 1.853*** (0.324) 7.085*** (2.013)
Industrial power (L1) 1.190** (0.447) 0.560*** (0.125) 2.291*** (0.679)
Palmoil (L1) 0.289*** (0.048) 0.181*** (0.035) 0.143 (0.169)
Rapsoil (L1) 0.019 (0.051) 0.129*** (0.014) -0.118 (0.075)
Rock Phosphate (L1) -0.135* (0.065) -0.250*** (0.047) -0.283 (0.323)
Cartel period 0.065*** (0.010) 0.026*** (0.005) 0.027 (0.023)
Constant -12.027*** (2.979) -8.338*** (0.866) -33.682*** (7.875)
Chains Yes No Yes
Brands Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20.352 13.813 1.060
Adj. R2 0.80 0.57 0.76
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% level
Robust and clustered std. errors (among brands) reported in parentheses
Turning to the mean effect of the cartel on prices, we find significant positive overcharges for
cartel and retailer brands, but no significant price increase for competitive manufacturer brands
during the period of collusion. On average, cartel products are 6.72% higher priced during the
collusive period than in the competitive state after cartel breakdown. The overcharge of retailer
brands (2.63%) additionally indicates that retailers indeed reacted to price changes by the market
leaders via own price adjustments, leading to significant umbrella effects during collusion. Hence,
33As our dependent variable is transformed by the logarithm function, the (percentage) marginal effects must be
calculated as the exponentiated coefficients minus one (not reported in the table).
34Our data do not contain retailer brand products that were sold with gimmicks.
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using retailer brands as control group for difference-in-differences estimations would result in an
underestimation of the true damage. However, apart from the fact that competitive manufacturers
did not react to elevated cartel prices with own price changes, there are several other reasons why
they constitute a more appropriate benchmark group than retailers. Firstly, the price setting of
cartel brands and competitive manufacturer brands is comparable since in both product groups,
producer margins as well as retailer margins are imposed, whereas retailer brand products merely
include a retailer margin. Secondly, cartel brands and manufacturer brands are promoted similarly
as the producing firms do costly national advertising in order to build up a certain image. Private
retailer brands by contrast are commissioned by the retailers via subcontracts and do not get
advertised in public media. Finally, while private retailer brands are only sold in the corresponding
stores they are produced for, both cartel brands and competitive manufacturer brands are generally
offered in all kinds of shops. Due to these aspects as well as the fact that we do not observe a
significant overcharge of competitive manufacturer brands, we use them as product counterfactual
in the subsequent difference-in-differences estimation. This additionally provides a robustness check
with respect to our results. A large deviation in the results between both approaches would either
indicate that the before-and-after model is flawed due to missing explanatory variables, or that
the benchmark brands in the difference-in-differences estimation do not constitute an appropriate
product counterfactual.35 On the other hand, if both approaches reveal similar cartel overcharges
we can conclude that the before-and-after model is already sufficiently specified and accounts for
all relevant price drivers. In particular, it implies that there are no substantial unobserved effects
a reference product group can control for and we might have omitted in the before-and-after
estimation.
4.3 Difference-in-differences approach: implementation and results
In order to implement the difference-in-differences estimation we extend our before-and-after model
from the previous section by the interaction term cartel_brands*cartel_period. It captures the
price increase of cartel firms during the period of collusion compared to the price development
of our benchmark brands (competitive manufacturers). Precisely, the estimated coefficient of the
underlying interaction term corresponds to the above mentioned price difference in the differences
of cartel and competitive manufacturer brands during and outside the cartel period. Table 4
summarizes the results.
The estimation reveals no general significant price change between the collusive and the com-
petitive period. However, relative to the reference group of manufacturer brands who capture
35Conversely, this is equivalent to saying that either the before-and-after model is correctly specified, i.e. accounts
for all relevant price drivers, or that the difference-in-differences model preforms better as the benchmark brands
add significant explanatory power with respect to the price variation over time.
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the competitive pricing behavior over time, we find a significant overcharge of 6.93% for cartel
brands, which is close to the 6.72% overcharge from the previous before-and-after estimation. We
can therefore conclude that our before-and-after model is already sufficiently specified in the sense
that competitive manufacturer brands do not add additional explanatory power to the development
of per kilogram prices over time.
Table 4: Difference-in-differences estimation results
Variable Ref. group: Man. brands
Concentrated 0.072 (0.063)
Color 0.007 (0.007)
Sensitive -0.003 (0.007)
Package size -0.183*** (0.016)
Package size(sq) 0.009*** (0.001)
Packaging: Bag 0.030 (0.028)
Packaging: Carry Pack -0.026 (0.016)
Gimmick -0.025 (0.019)
Promotion -0.113*** (0.008)
Chem. base mat. (L1) 0.074 (0.245)
Industrial power (L1) 1.230** (0.397)
Retail prices (L1) 1.639** (0.565)
Palmoil (L1) 0.276*** (0.045)
Rapsoil (L1) 0.011 (0.044)
Rock Phosphate (L1) -0.121* (0.059)
Cartel period -0.001 (0.037)
Cartel_brands*cartel_period 0.068* (0.036)
Constant -13.593*** (3.054)
Chains Yes
Brands Yes
Observations 21.412
Adj. R2 0.80
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% level
Robust and clustered (among brands) std. errors reported in parentheses
4.4 Quantification of consumer damages
Given the overcharge estimates of the before-and-after estimation from the previous section we now
turn to the quantification of the consumer harm. Since each cartelist offers numerous products
of washing powder that differ regarding package type and size (and therefore also with respect
to the per kilogram price), we first calculate the absolute overcharge for each single product type
individually. However, as the dependent variable is in logarithm we cannot directly multiply the
estimated coefficients by the paid price but rather have to run an auxiliary regression to get
a consistent adjustment factor.36 In order to extrapolate the damages for the entire German
population, we weight each purchase act by the representativeness of the buying household. For
36Following Jensen’s inequality the expected logarithm of price and the logarithm of the expected price do not
coincide (E(log(p)) 6= log(E(p))). We therefore have to predict log(p) using the estimated model, calculate the
exponential of it and use it as explanatory variable for a regression on the real price itself, without a constant.
The calculated adjustment factors for the cartel and retailer regressions are 1.0274 and 1.0038, respectively. See
Wooldridge (2003) for further information on this approach.
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this purpose, we use scaling factors that were provided along with the dataset.37
Since our previous estimations revealed that the retailers reacted to the price increase of the
market leaders via price adjustments of their own detergent products, we additionally calculate
the monetary effect of this umbrella pricing. Table 5 summarizes the respective results.
Table 5: Consumer harm and umbrella effect between July 2004 and March 2005
Cartel damage Umbrella effect
Overcharge (%) 6.72 2.63
Damage (Mio. €) 13.210 1.738
Turnover in CP (Mio. €) 183.471 63.693
Damage as % of CP Turnover 7.20 2.73
Our results suggest that the overall monetary consumer damage caused by the three cartel firms
in the relevant product category between July 2004 and March 2005 amounts to 13.210 million
Euro. Compared to the turnover generated by the cartel firms during this period in the respective
product category, the damage corresponds to 7.20% of turnover.
If we assume that both cartel pricing and consumer behavior during these last nine months of
collusion are representative for the entire cartel period, the overall damage suffered over the entire
cartel period from January 2002 until March 2005 even amounts to 55.775 million Euro.
It is important to note that this calculated damage solely refers to the German detergent
market. According to the EC eight further European markets such as France, Spain or Italy were
affected by the cartel. Following the decision document of the EC, the total annual cartel member
sales in the eight affected countries sum up to about 1.385 billion Euros for the relevant category.38
Calculating 7.20% for 38 months would then result in an overall consumer damage of 315.78 million
Euro.39 Interestingly, this number is pretty close to the 315.2 million Euro fine imposed by the
EC in 2011.
Turning to the umbrella pricing we quantify this effect to 1.738 million Euro for the last nine
months of the cartel agreement. Under the assumption that the reaction of the retailers during this
period is representative for the entire cartel duration, the umbrella effect amounts to 7.34 million
Euro. Although not directly caused by the cartel firms this harm leads to an additional decrease
in consumer welfare, raising the overall monetary damage for consumers in Germany to a total of
63.115 million Euro.
37Unfortunately, the original scaling factors provided by Nielsen were related to only one point in time. Due to
the high number of panel entries and exits of households over time we could not use them directly. However, owing
to the high accuracy of the scaling factors and using information on panel entry and exit dates, we could recalculate
adjusted factors on a weekly basis. In total, the recalculated scaling factors sum up to 39.11 Mio., which coincides
with the number of German households during the years 2004 and 2005.
38Supra n. 6.
39This assumption is obviously critically and would not hold before court. However, we make this assumption in
order to illustrate the dimension of consumer damages due to a cartel. In practice one would nevertheless have to
use data for all affected markets as well as the entire cartel period in order to quantify the exact overall damage.
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5 Conclusion
Motivated by the current discussion whether special procedures for bringing collective actions
to protect consumer interests should be available in the EU, we showed in this paper how con-
sumer panel data can be used in order to estimate overcharges and to quantify consumer damages
from price-fixing agreements. Our estimations for the European detergent cartel suggest average
overcharges between 6.7 and 6.9 percent and an overall consumer damage of 13.2 million Euro in
Germany over the period from July 2004 until March 2005. Under the assumptions that the pricing
behavior of cartelists and buying behavior of consumers during the last nine months of carteliza-
tion are representative for the entire cartel period, the overall consumer damage even accounts for
about 55.7 million Euro. If we further assume that the estimate is relevant for all affected markets,
we observe an overall damage of about 315 million Euro.
Although our results indicate that it is straightforward to quantify consumer damages, several
obstacles for consumer associations in order to implement our approach in practice still remain.
Firstly, on EU level there is no clear authorization for such organizations to claim consumer
damages so far. The implementation of such a regulation however would not only enable consumer
associations to actively fulfill their mandate of consumer protection, but would even contribute to
increased cartel deterrence, since the fact that any individual or entity can claim damages hampers
the possibility for cartels to ex-ante predict the financial success of a potential cartel agreement.
Precisely, without effective private enforcement firms can use the EU Guidelines on the method of
setting fines in which the calculation of fines is described in detail in order to ex-ante approximate
the success of a potential cartel participation. With private enforcement on the other hand, it is
almost impossible to predict who is going to claim damages in case of cartel detection and what the
overall fine will be at the end. Hence, although it is ambiguous whether this undermines existing
leniency programs40, such an uncertainty should generally reduce firms’ enthusiasm regarding cartel
participation and thereby increase deterrence.
Secondly, it is essential for claimants to get access to evidence. Apart from general case in-
formation - which in the detergent case is rather scarce - it is particularly important to have the
opportunity to gather relevant data that can be used for damage estimations. Whereas consumer
panel data are easy to obtain from firms who are specialized in collecting scanner data, wholesale
prices are usually impossible to get without the help of public authorities. The availability of
consumer panel data along with wholesale data however would allow for a more in-depth analysis
of consumer damages. In particular, one could compare the overcharges on retailer and final con-
sumer layer and thus analyze passing-on effects and the distribution of harm between the different
40One way for ruling this out would be to exclude whistleblowers from private enforcement. This could even
increase the incentives to apply for leniency and thereby reduce cartel stability.
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layers more accurately.
Last but not least, since the incentive for every single consumer to claim damage is relatively
low due to the small individual loss, it is necessary to provide a practical system that effectively
allows to bundle individual claims. It is doubtful whether an opt-in procedure as proposed by the
European Commission is sufficient or whether on an opt-out redress system is the preferred option.
As noted by the European consumer consultative group, recent experience in Europe showed that
the rate of consumer participation of the opt-in procedure is extremely low (less than 1 percent)
in comparison to an opt-out regime (between 97 and 100 percent).41 The latter would therefore
certainly increase incentives to sue and therefore facilitate consumer organizations to represent
consumers interests.
41Id at 4.
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